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This paper estimates the parameters of the ideas production function crucial to recent 
ideas-driven  growth  models.  Using  U.  S.  patents  granted  to  residents  in  OECD 
countries  in  order  to  construct  the  stock  of  commercially  used  ideas,  we  provide 
evidence for two main findings. First, at the level of the production of ideas, we find 
evidence of increasing returns to scale in the stock of ideas and number of researchers, 
but  marginal  decreasing  returns  in  each  one  of  these  factors.  Second,  we  provide 
evidence of the association between ideas growth and economic growth, for the OECD 
as a whole, in the long run. 
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Neste artigo estimámos os parâmetros de uma função de produção de ideias, tarefa 
crucial para avaliar a adesão dos modelos recentes de alteração tecnológica endógena à 
evidência empírica. Utilizando os dados sobre patentes norte-americanas, atribuídas a 
residentes nos países da OCDE, de modo a construir stocks de ideias comercializáveis, 
o  presente  trabalho  fundamenta  duas  conclusões  principais.  Primeiro,  ao  nível  da 
produção de ideias, verificámos a existência de rendimentos crescentes à escala no 
stock de ideias e número de investigadores, mas rendimentos marginais decrescentes 
em cada um destes factores. Em segundo lugar, verificámos uma associação entre o 
crescimento das ideias e o crescimento económico, para a OCDE como um todo, no 
longo prazo. 
Palavras-chave:  Crescimento  endógeno,  externalidades,  inovação,  intervenção 
pública, patentes. 
Classificação JEL: 031, 040. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A  crucial  economic  attribute  of  knowledge,  highlighted  in  recent  models  of 
endogenous  growth,  is  that  ideas  are  both  non-rival  and  cumulative.  Non-rivalry 
implies that one person’s use of an idea does not prevent another person from using it 
at the same time. Moreover, ideas are cumulative: one precise idea leads to another 
idea which may in turn lead to yet further ideas. Analysis of these attributes of non-
rivalry and cumulative feedback has led growth theorists to speculate that investment 
in the generation of ideas can be the engine of long-run growth.  
Ideas  are  nonrivalrous  goods,  but  they  vary  to  a  large  extent  in  their  degree  of 
excludability. Nonrivalrous goods that are basically unexcludable are labelled public 
goods. The public-good nature of knowledge, that is, non-rivalry in association with 
the impossibility of excluding someone from its benefits, leads us to expect market 
failure. When others reap the benefits of someone’s new ideas, market forces alone are 
unlikely to generate the optimal level of investment in knowledge — implying a need 
for government intervention. 
A crucial difference between the neo-classical and the new growth theories concerns 
the question of whether the long-run rate of growth of the economy is an exogenous 
constant,  or  whether  it  can  be  influenced  by  public  policy.  To  the  extent  that 
technological change is endogenous in ideas-driven models, we expect the generation 
of ideas to have long-run growth effects in addition to the conventional prediction of 
level effects. Putting it another way, the question is whether policies and institutions 
that  influence  the rate  of accumulation of physical capital and/or knowledge have 
long-run effects on the level of economic activity or on its rate of growth
1. 
Another crucial debate within the new growth theory is centred on the role of the 
“ideas”  sector  in  sustaining  equilibrium  productivity  growth.  In  Romer’s  seminal 
model  of  endogenous  technological  change,  productivity  growth  is  driven  by  a 
constant allocation of resources to an ideas-producing sector (Romer, 1990), a result 
that  depends  critically  on  strong  positive  intertemporal  spillovers  in  the  ideas 
production.  Specifically,  to  generate ideas-driven growth, ideas  sector  productivity 
must  increase  proportionally  with  the  stock  of  ideas  already  discovered.  The 
                                                            
1 However, for purposes of practical policy-making, this distinction may be relatively unimportant — if 
the ‘long-run’ never arrives. If economies are subject to shocks of sufficient magnitude and frequency, 
it may be difficult, if not impossible, to tell how the long-run growth path really looks like.    3 
significance of ideas-driven growth therefore depends on whether the ideas production 
function satisfies this critical property. To evaluate this claim, several authors have 
examined the relationship between the total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate and 
the size of the workforce devoted to the production of ideas (Jones, 1995; Coe and 
Helpman, 1995).  
The ideas-driven model, with the assumptions made by Romer, predicts that expansion 
in the number of researchers leads to a permanent increase in the TFP growth rate. In 
contrast, the empirical evidence suggests that most OECD economies have increased 
the size of their R&D workforce, while experiencing (at best) constant TFP growth 
rates. This weak relationship between the number of reserchers and the TFP growth 
rate has led some to question the viability of ideas-driven growth for the long run 
(Jones, 2001)
2. 
This paper aims at contributing to the empirical understanding of the economic growth 
by  estimating  the  shape  of  the  ideas  production  function  and  the  strength  of  the 
intertemporal spillovers in ideas. We shall examine the pattern of patents granted in 
the United States to inventors from OECD countries, and use the patent counts to 
construct a stock of commercially relevant ideas. This stock of ideas, together with the 
number of researchers, will allow us to evaluate the determinants of the flow of new 
ideas directly. First, we’ll separate ideas production from the more general relationship 
between  the  ideas  sector  and  the  overall  productivity  growth.  Accordingly,  by 
computing the stock of ideas over time, we’ll be able to estimate explicitly the strength 
of the spillover from ideas-to-ideas. But, if the generation of ideas is the engine of 
growth, we should expect to find that embodied human capital – skills and abilities – 
also affect long-run growth. Ideas do not reproduce themselves without the input of 
highly skilled researchers. So, we’ll compute the elasticity of new ideas with respect to 
the number of researchers, too.  
Secondly, we’ll address the long-run evolution of the GDP per worker and of ideas. In 
order to attain this goal we’ll examine the statistical association between the evolution 
of measured ideas and the GDP per worker variation, in the OECD as a whole.  
The following section describes the characteristics of ideas-driven models that have 
been identified by recent theories of economic growth and presents the theory that 
                                                            
2 Several authors instead argue that productivity growth rates can be explained by factor accumulation 
including the accumulation of human capital (Barro, 1991; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992).    4 
supports the model used in empirical tests. In section 3, we explain the construction of 
our stocks of commercially used ideas and the data used. The empirical findings about 
spillovers are depicted in section 4. Section 5 compares the evolution of ideas with the 
economic growth. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
2. THEORY 
Several authors have discussed the attributes of knowledge that make it significantly 
different from the accumulation of items of physical capital (Romer, 1990, 1993). 
These special attributes are: non-rivalry and dynamic feedback. Once a new idea has 
been  generated,  it  can  be  used  simultaneously  and  cost-free  in  many  different 
processes. Furthermore, the idea can serve as an example and inspiration for further 
research. But the properties of non-rivalry and feedback also suggest that the market 
may fail to allocate sufficient resources to knowledge generation because individuals 
have difficulty in establishing and enforcing property rights over their new ideas – 
some of the benefits of an innovation are likely to accrue to others. When the private 
return to innovation is less than the social return, governments need to subsidise R&D. 
R&D expenditures typically constitute, for advanced economies, only a few percent of 
GDP  —  perhaps  one  tenth  of  the  expenditure  devoted  to  investment  in  physical 
equipment and structures. In a standard growth accounting framework, variations in 
the research effort will, therefore, explain very little of the differences in growth rates 
between countries. But the point of much of the new growth theory is precisely that if 
knowledge spillovers are substantial, and if knowledge exhibits  dynamic feedback 
effects,  then  even  small  changes  in  the  resources  devoted  to  the  production  of 
knowledge may result in substantial changes in economic growth
3.  
In order to approach the empirical tests, we’ll start with the basic formulation of an 
endogenous growth model. In a simple formulation of a varieties model, output, Y, is 
given from an aggregate production function as: 
 





1 a a   (1) 
                                                            
3  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991)  calibrate  their  model  to  match  the  US  growth  experience,  and 
emphasize this point. They predict that, whilst business investment constitutes around ten percent of 
GDP, investment in R&D — the engine of growth — needs to comprise as little as 1.6 percent to 
generate economic growth of 2.5 percent per year.   5 
Where  B  is  an  exogenous  technology  factor,  Ly  is  labour input, xj is the quantity 
employed of intermediate input of type j
4, A is the number of varieties of intermediate 
products that are currently known and used and  1 0 < <a . 
In  Romer’s  seminal  model  of  endogenous  technological  change,  there  are  three 
sectors: one sector producing final goods, one sector producing intermediate-goods 
and another making research and development (R&D). So, the output stream, Y, can 
be consumed, used as intermediate inputs to production or allocated to R&D. 
In equilibrium, each intermediate is employed at the same level, x=K/A, where K 











A BL Y y
1   (2) 
Or, presenting production function in its more common form: 
  ( )
( ) a a - =
1
y AL BK Y   (3) 
Describing the way as capital stock, K, and labour input, Ly, combines to produce 
output, Y, using the stock of ideas A. Technological progress occurs through R&D 
outlays that rise A over time. For a given technological level A, equation (3) exhibits 
constant returns to scale. However, when we recognise the non-rival nature of ideas 
(Romer,  1990),  then  there  are  increasing  returns.  In  other  words,  the  production 
function exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and labour inputs, and therefore 
must exhibit increasing returns with respect to all three inputs: K, Ly, and A.  
For simplicity, we admit that capital and labour accumulates as in the Solow (1956) 
model:  capital  accumulates  according  to  some  given  investment  rate,  k s ,  and 
depreciates at the exogenous rate d : 
  K Y s K k d - = ￿   (4) 
Total labour (L) in the economy, is used either to produce output (Ly), or to produce 
ideas ( A L ): 
  A y L L L + =   (5) 
 
                                                            
4 Alternatively xj may be treated, for simplicity, as non-durable. In that case xj represents the service 
flow from the jth type of capital good.   6 
And grows exponentially at some constant and exogenous rate n: 
  nt
t e L L 0 =   (6) 
In the long run, along a balanced growth path, two important questions may arise: 
what is the growth rate predicted by the model? And, what is the rate of technological 
progress? The first question has an answer, which is similar to the one that occurs in 
the neo-classical growth model, that is, if there is a constant fraction of the population 
in the production of ideas, the model predicts that all per capita growth is due to 
technological progress. In other words, per capita output, the capital/labour ratio and 
the stock of ideas must grow at the same rate, along a balanced growth path. That is, 
no technological progress means no growth. 
In order to answer the second question, we need to draw the ideas production sector, 
and specifically the way new ideas are invented. One can imagine several possibilities 
for the rate at which researchers discover new ideas. This rate may be a constant, or it 
can depend on the stock of ideas that have already been invented, or even it may 
depend on the number of researchers. In the simplest case, the number of new ideas, 
A ￿ , is equal to the number of researchers,  A L , multiplied by the rate at which they 
discover new ideas,  c . That is,  A L A c = ￿  
Every  individual  researcher  views  his  produced  ideas  as  new,  and  feels  constant 
returns  on  his  investigation.  He  or  she  produces  c   new  ideas.  However,  in  the 
economy as a whole, the aggregate research effort doesn’t generate an output equal to 
the resulting sum of the individual efforts. It is very plausible that some different 
researchers find out the same commercially relevant ideas. So, we can represent by l  
a negative externality that result of duplication, and the aggregate function takes the 
form: 
  l c A L A = ￿   (7) 
Where  l  is a parameter between 0 and 1. But the rate  c , itself, may depend on the 
number of ideas already discovered, that is: 
  f p c A =   (8)   7 
Where  f   specifies  the  grade  of  dependence  between  c   and  A,  and  0 > p   is  a 
constant
5. With the equation 8, if  0 > f  the productivity of research increases with the 
stock of the ideas that have already been discovered. If we assume f =1, the number of 
new ideas is also proportional to the stock of ideas discovered in the past and the 
growth rate of ideas becomes itself proportional to the number of researchers. In this 
case,  like  in  Romer’s  model,  it  is  the  number  of  people engaged in research and 
development that drives long-run growth.  
In  fact,  in  addressing  the  problem  of  limits  to  human  capabilities,  Paul  Romer 
emphasises the distinction between human capital — the skills and abilities that are 
embodied in individual humans —, and ideas, which are disembodied knowledge. He 
focuses  on  the  properties  of  the  latter  category,  the  world  of  ideas  and  research, 
supposing that there is sufficient dynamic feedback in the research sector to generate 
endogenous  growth  and  that  the  scope  for  developing  new  ideas  is  limitless. 
According this, the mathematical representation of the generation of new ideas, in 
Romer’s model, is: 
  A L A A p = ￿ .  (9) 
Where  A ￿  represents the number of new ideas created at time t, LA represents the 
amount of human capital, or the number of researchers, devoted to innovation, and A 
represents the stock of ideas existing until time t. 
As it is apparent from equation 9, Romer assumes that the productivity of the research 
is  directly  proportional  to  the  extant stock  of knowledge
6. In  the  accumulation of 
disembodied ideas, rather than embodied skills, it is indeed plausible to suppose that 
the level of current output might be directly proportional to the size of the stock. The 
more ideas that we have to draw on, the easier it is to generate new ones. Moreover, 
ideas do not necessarily disappear when their developer dies — they can typically be 
recorded and transmitted at minimal cost. Implicit in Romer’s formulation of research 
output is the idea that there is an evenly distributed and infinite universe of potential 
                                                            
5  p is  usually  assumed  as  constant.  But,  p   may  depend,  within  other  factors,  on  institutions  and 
political  choices,  on  the  more  or  less  innovation-friend  environment,  and  on  the  linkages  within 
innovation infrastructure and industrial clusters. 
6  This  is  the  “standing  on  shoulders”  hypothesis  of  knowledge  accumulation,  so  labeled  by  Jones 
(1998), in reference to Isaac Newton’s disclaimer: “If I have seen farther than others, it is because I was 
standing on the shoulders of giants”.   8 
ideas waiting to be discovered. So, a given amount of research effort will produce a 
predictable number of new ideas
7.  
Jones (1995, 1998) criticises some of the key assumptions underpinning the Romer’s 
model. In particular, he suggests that knowledge formation may become more difficult 
over time as the easy ideas are discovered first, leaving subsequent researchers with a 
pool that has been “fished out”. He also suggests that researchers may often duplicate 
each  other’s  efforts:  “stepping  on  toes”  rather  than  “standing  on  shoulders”.  So, 
according to Jones, the ideas production function took the form, which is obtained by 
combining equation 7 with equation 8
8: 
  f l p A L A A = ￿   (10) 
In the ideas production function 10, two kinds of externalities may be represented. 
One, related to the R&D workers (l ) and the other associated to the existing stock of 
ideas, which occurs with  0 ¹ f . For instance,  1 < l  may reflect a negative externality 
associated with duplication: some of the ideas created by a researcher may not be new 
to the economy as a whole. On the other hand, we can think of existing externalities 
associated to the stock of ideas: when  0 > f  the R&D productivity increases with the 
already discovered stock of ideas, reflecting  a positive knowledge spillover; when 
0 < f , the “fishing-out hypothesis”, R&D productivity decreases with the increased 
stock of ideas: the ideas discovered first are the easiest to find. So, knowing f  and l is 
essential to contribute to the ideas driven-growth debate. 
Now  we  can  think  about  the  second  question:  what  is  the  rate  of  technological 










  (11) 
That is, the long-run growth rate of the economy is determined by the parameters of 
the  production  function  of  ideas  and  the  rate  of  growth  of  researchers,  which  is 
ultimately given by the population growth rate, n. If l =1 and f =0, ideas production 
function  takes  the  form  A L A p = ￿   and  researchers  productivity  is  the  constant  p , 
                                                            
7  Otherwise,  we  can  allow  the  fluctuation  of  the  discovery  rate,  as  Aghion  and  Howitt  (1998) 
summarized in their discussion of General Purpose Technologies. 
8 Equation 10 can also be seen as a more general form of equation 9, if we are assuming  l =1 and 
f =1.   9 
meaning that there are no negative duplication externalities in the research process and 
the productivity of a researcher in the present is independent of the ideas discovered in 
the past. If LA keeps constant, with  l =1 e  f =0, the economy generates a constant 
number of new ideas in every period, meaning that the stock of ideas growth rate 
decreases over time, though technical progress don’t ceases. In order to have growth, 
the number of new ideas must grow over time. One way of achieving this outcome is 
to assume that the number of researches shall rise over time, too. 
Dropping f =0 restriction, there is a special case in which a constant research effort 
can generate long-run sustained growth. If  l =1 and f =1, as in the model of Romer 
(1990),  the  differential  equation  A L A
A p = ￿   which  leads  technological  evolution,  is 
linear and the model predicts that research productivity increases over time, even in 
the presence of a constant number of researchers. But, with these assumptions, an 
increase in the dimension of the economy leads to an increase in the per capita growth 
rates of the economy and generates an infinite growth in the long run. This prediction 
wasn’t corroborated by time. On the contrary, in the last half-century the economic 
growth rate was actually rather inferior to the researchers’ growth rate
9. 
But the fact that the number of researchers is growing more than per capita GDP, 
doesn’t necessary mean that there aren’t increasing returns in investigation, or positive 
knowledge spillovers. It only means that the empirical experience indicates that the 
case of f =1 is highly unreliable
10. 
Assessing  if  function  10  is  empirically  verifiable  in  OECD,  and  finding  out  the 
parameters  l   and  f ,  are  fundamental  tasks  to  understand  the  dynamics  of  ideas 
generation and the way these ideas affect the economic growth. So, the next section 
reports the data and the process we have used to construct the stock of commercially 
relevant ideas, necessary to test empirically the ideas production function. 
3. DATA AND THE STOCK OF IDEAS 
In order to assess the empirical evidence, we’ll start with equation 10. Taking natural 
logs, we have: 
                                                            
9 It’s worth to note that in the late half-century the number of researchers registered has increased much 
more than the population, whose growth rate is generally pointed as a limit to the LA growth.  
10 Also the case of f >1 doesn’t seem very acceptable, as it implies acceleration in the economic growth 
rate, even with a constant population.    10 
  A L A A ln ln ln ln f l p + + = ￿   (12) 
Equation 12 may give estimates to the parameters l  and f  by Least Squares methods, 
considering  p ln  constant and assuming that we have data on  A ￿ ,  A L , and  A. For  A L  
we’ll use researchers data of OECD. The use of the number of researchers supplied by 
the statistics, as proxy of  A L , is subject to critique. We are conscious that these figures 
exclude the effort of many small firms, so as the resolution of technical problems at 
the firm level, which generate improvements in products and processes. In order to 
estimate the ideas production function, in the absence of a better proxy, we use the 
number of researchers (full-time equivalent), given by OECD (MSTI database) as an 
index of the number of workers that create economically relevant ideas.  
The choice of indicators for  A ￿  and  A deserves some additional comments. The most 
obvious indicators, in order to construct the stock of ideas ( A) and the number of new 
economically useful ideas ( A ￿ ), are the R&D outlays and the patent counts. Coe and 
Helpman (1995) have built stocks of ideas to which they have given the name of R&D 
capital  stock  for  21  OECD  countries,  plus  Israel,  making  use  of  business  sector 
research and development expenditure (BERD) data. In the present paper, we shall use 
utility patents granted in the United States to residents of OECD countries in order to 
construct the proxies of  A ￿  and  A. The main reasons to have chosen patent counts 
instead of BERD are as follow. 
Theoretically, a patent does represent a minimal quantum of invention that has passed 
both the examination of the patent office, as to its originality, and the test of the 
investment  of  effort  and  resources  by  the  inventor  and  his  organisation  into  the 
development  of  this  product  or  idea,  indicating  thus  the  presence  of  a  significant 
expectation  as  to  its  final  utility  and  marketability.  These  characteristics  suggest 
patents as an output indicator of inventive activity appropriate to measure ideas and 
the  stock  of  ideas.  But,  there  is  a  correlation  between  business  enterprise  R&D 
expenditures (BERD) and patent counts, as we can observe in figure 1, which shows 
the association between BERD, for 28 OECD countries
11, in 1997, and patents granted 
in  the  United  States  to  inventors  residents  in  each  one  of  those  countries.  Both 
                                                            
11 Totality of OECD minus Luxembourg, which doesn’t present data on R&D, and Slovakia whose data 
on patents are less reliable.    11 
variables are presented in logarithmic scale
12. It is apparent in figure 1 that there is a 
high positive correlation between the two variables (correlation coefficient = 0.995)
13. 
But, besides high correlation, there is some evidence, that shows that the correlation is 
higher between total factor productivity (TFP) and patent counts, than between TFP 
and BERD (see Griliches, 1989; fig. 6 and Griliches, 1990, fig. 10). 
Sources: OCDE (MSTI data base), and USPTO. 
Patent use is subject to several critiques. The first, and the most emphasised, observes 
that not all inventions are patentable, and not all inventions are patented. Besides, the 
inventions that are patented differ greatly in quality, in the size of inventive output 
associated with them. In relationship to these critics we can always invoke the law of 
large numbers, like Scherer, (1965): The economic significance of any sampled patent 
can also be interpreted as a random variable with some probability distribution. Given 
the underlying heterogeneity, the question is to know whether our samples are large 
enough, in a way that authorises the use of the law of large numbers. 
But,  on the  other  hand,  the  increase in  the  number  of patents granted, more  than 
representing an increase in the economically useful ideas, could be the result of the 
rise of international trade, or the outcome of a stronger concern with the protection of 
                                                            
12  To  reduce  the  effects  of  the  problems  associated  to  the  cycles  in  the  grant  of  patents,  we  have 
considered the average of the number of patents in 1997 and 1998.  
13 The correlation coefficient would be even higher if we had excluded from the sample, Turkey, Poland 
and Czech Republic, for these countries present a dissonant pattern from the other OECD countries. 
Figure 1. Association between BERD and patent counts 
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intellectual property rights, in the same way as it could reflect the existence of cyclical 
waves in the realisation important
 ideas
14.  
The  use  of  patent  counts  to  draw  the  stock  of  economic  useful  ideas  doesn’t 
necessarily mean that patents are the only output of economically relevant innovation, 
or that patents are the ideal measure of such output. Instead, we merely assume that 
patents give a useful index of the general innovation activity. The crucial assumption 
that we adopt is that a constant fraction of innovation output is valuable enough in 
order to deserve a patent, and that the fraction is constant across economies. 
With all these considerations in mind, we have measured the number of new ideas and 
the stock of commercially relevant ideas by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) utility patents granted to inventors residents in the OECD countries
15. 
The stock of ideas (A) is calculated from patent counts (P) granted by USPTO based 
on the perpetual inventory model:  
  ( ) 1 1 1 - - + - = t t t P A d A   (13) 
Where d, the obsolescence rate, means the rate of substitution of the old ideas by the 
new ideas. 
The initial stock of ideas, A0, is calculated as:  
 
d g
P A + = 0
0   (14) 
Where g is the average annual logarithmic growth rate of patent counts over the period 
for which data were available, and P0 is the patent counts for the first year for which 
the data on utility patents are available (in the present case 1963-1998 period). While g 
is country-specific, we admit that d is the same for all countries. 
The most severe problem we face in constructing the stock of ideas is the arbitration of 
the obsolescence rate, d. Some models of endogenous growth, like Romer’s, suggest 
that new ideas increase the stock of ideas without obsolescence of the older ideas. So 
                                                            
14  It  is  convenient  to  discriminate  cyclical  fluctuations,  associated  to  political  and  bureaucratic 
problems, from the cyclical waves, associated to innovations (Schumpeter, 1939, 1942; Freeman, 1982). 
In the first case, simple statistical measures can minimize their effects, while in the second case the 
wave has a meaning that we can’t ignore in the result analysis. 
15  In calculating the stock of ideas we use only utility patents (patents of invention) and not total patent 
counts. The reason for this option is that we suspect that the different types of patents have different 
effects on the production of new ideas. Because the distribution of total patents by different types varies 
across countries, we need a weighting criterion to build a stock of ideas comparable across countries. In 
the absence of such criterion, we decided to use only utility patents, which correspond to the larger 
percentage in the total number of patents.    13 
variety models seem more suitable to the estimation of the equation 12, because they 
take  away  the  need  of  arbitration  of  the  obsolescence  rate. However, if  we don’t 
control  obsolescence,  the  stock  of  ideas  depends  crucially  on  the  time  chosen  to 
calculate  the  initial  stock  of  ideas.  In  the  absence  of  a  cleverer  method  of 
determination  of  obsolescence  rate,  we  have  calculated  the  stock  of ideas  in four 
hypotheses: d=0%, d=5%, d=10% e d=15%. 
4. SPILLOVERS 
In the following empirical tests we’ll consider two samples. The first one (sample-
basis) comprises 27 countries of the OECD. In this sample we have considered every 
country of OECD except Luxembourg because this country doesn’t report data about 
researchers, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia because data about patent counts 
don’t allow us to construct a stock of ideas according the same criteria used for the 
other countries
16, that is, discriminate patents granted to residents in each country. 
The second sample (reduced sample) contains the countries included in the sample-
basis minus Poland, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Mexico and Hungary. The exclusion of 
these countries is justified for two reasons. First, because they are the less developed 
countries, and so it is likely that growth pattern won’t be the same as the other (more 
developed)  countries.  Secondly,  the  behaviour  of  technological  indicators  is  also 
distinct. In these excluded countries, per capita technological indicators are either very 
low (Portugal, Turkey, Greece), or they exhibit, in several periods, negative growth 
rates (Poland, Mexico and Hungary). These characteristics indicate that technological 
accumulation follows a different path
17. Besides, the low level and the negative growth 
rate of patent counts must contribute to extra measurement errors in the calculation of 
the stock of ideas. 
Empirical  results  of  the  regressions  are  represented  in  two  tables.  In  table  1,  we 
present the estimates for sample-basis and in table 2, the estimates for the reduced 
                                                            
16  We  don’t  have  the  possibility  of  discriminating  in  the  patent  counts  of  the  old  Czechoslovakia 
between the patents that must be attributed to Czech Republic and those pertaining to Slovakia, in the 
time span between 1963 and separation of the two new republics. 
17 The exclusion of these countries is also based on other reasons. For instance, in Portugal, during 
1988-1997 period, correlation coefficient analysis indicates that there isn’t an ideas production function 
of the same kind as that of the reduced sample. In fact, correlation coefficient of number of researchers 
LA, with the number of new ideas  A ￿ , was –0.3. On the other hand, the measured correlation between 
the stock of ideas A, and new ideas A ￿ , was –0.58.   14 
sample.  In  each  table  results  are  distributed  in  four  columns,  according  to  the 
obsolescence rate, d, used in the calculation of stock of ideas. 
Table 1. 
Ideas production function estimation results for OECD (sample-basis), 1998. 




























2 R   0.72  0.97  0.98  0.98 
Source:  Researchers  — OCDE, MSTI database;  Patent counts — USPTO. Notes: t statistics 
(White  heteroskedasticity-consistent)  in  parentheses,  *  1%  signification  level;  **  5% 
signification level; +Not significant. 
In  the  estimates  of  table  1,  we  can  discriminate  two  situations,  according  to  the 
consideration, or not, of the obsolescence of ideas. In d=0% hypothesis, the explicative 
power of the model is lower and the elasticity of new ideas with respect to the number 
of  researchers  (l ),  as  expected,  is  larger  than  when  we  consider  obsolescence. 
However, the high value of l , indicating positive agglomeration externalities, doesn’t 
seem realistic, because with  1 > l , together with the growing number of researchers, 
means  that  the  growth  rate  of  ideas  should  rise  without  any  boundary.  With  the 
obtained  estimates  of  l   and  f , in  the  long run, per  capita  GDP should increase 
without any limit to infinite. 
In the obsolescence hypothesis, the elasticity of new ideas with respect to the number 
of  researchers  (l )  loses  it  statistical  significance.  Additionally,  l   estimate  will 
become negative with the increase of the obsolescence rate. In spite of this weakness, 
let’s consider the estimates to verify model behaviour. With d equal or superior to 
10%, we face decreasing returns to scale, because the elasticity of ideas (f ) doesn’t 
balance the negative value of  l . However, with a constant number of researchers, 
given  the  high  elasticity  of  stock  of ideas (f >1),  the  growth rate of ideas would 
increase. But, with  0 < l  an increase of LA would have as consequence the decrease of 
the growth rate of ideas, and so, of the economic growth rate.   15 
These outcomes to the sample-basis are counterfactual: in the last forty years, at least, 
the  per  capita  growth  of  income  coexisted  with  growth  of  researchers.  This 
counterfactual result, together with the loss of statistical significance, when the new 
ideas substitute the old ones, questions the appropriateness of the model to sample-
basis of the OECD. 
Let’s analyse then the reduced sample (table 2). In the reduced sample, whatever d, the 
model presents a high explicative power, with a 
2 R  equal or superior to 97% and a t 
(White heteroskedasticity-consistent) statistic also significant at 1% level, excepting 
only the elasticity of the new ideas with respect to the number of researchers (l ) 
when  % d 5 ³ . But even in this case, the coefficient keeps significant at the 5% level. 
For any d, estimates of  l  and f  are positive and less than 1. This means that in the 
ideas production function each one of the factors LA and A have marginal decreasing 
returns. So, the increase in the number of researchers, either the increase in stock of 
ideas have a positive effect on the number of new ideas, but this effect is smaller and 
smaller as the respective factor increases. The obtained results also show, that the 
production of ideas is generated at increasing returns to scale, though that generation 
occurs in a small percentage beyond constant returns. Simultaneous increase of LA and 
A generates a more than proportional increase in the number of new ideas A ￿ . 
Table 2 
Ideas production function estimation results, for 21 OECD countries, 1998. 




























2 R   0.97  0.98  0.99  0.99 
Source:  Researchers  —  OCDE,  MSTI  database;  Patent  counts  —  USPTO.  Notes:  t  (White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent)  statistic  in  parentheses,  *  1%  signification  level;  **  5% 
signification level. 
However, for any d, being the number of new ideas less than proportional to the stock 
of existing ideas ( 1 < f ), the growth rate of ideas can only rise if there is an increase in   16 
number of researchers. With LA constant  A A ￿  is decreasing, and the model doesn’t 
generate per capita or per worker growth in the long run. 
5. IDEAS GROWTH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The ideas driven model  predicts  that  A A k k y y ￿ ￿ ￿ = = , with a constant share of the 
population employed in the production of ideas, in the long run, once attained the 
steady-state  path.  That  is,  the  per  capita  output  and  the  capital/labour  ratio  must 
increase at the same rate as the stock of ideas. This equality deserves an additional test.  
In table 3, we report two types of ideas growth rates to the OECD countries
18: the 
actual growth rate in 1998 and the long run trend. In the former we have used as  A ￿  
measure the average of the utility patent counts granted by USPTO from 1995 to 1998 
and we have employed as denominator the measure of the stock of ideas in 1998, 
calculated as previously (equations 13-14), admitting obsolescence rates of 0% and 
5%
19. 
To assess the growth trend of ideas, we’ll begin with the calculation of the stock of 
ideas for every year from 1963 to 2002, according the method and sources previously 
referred  to,  and  afterwards  we’ll  compute,  by  regression,  with  a  continuous 
exponential  function  the  instantaneous growth  rate. The trend growth of  GDP per 
capita  and  GDP  per  worker  are  measured  for  1950-2000  e  1962-2000  periods, 
respectively, with trends instantaneous rates, which were calculated by us with PWT 
6.1 (Heston, 2002) data, through the OLS method.  
Table 3 shows that the growth rate of ideas is usually higher than growth trends of 
GDP per capita and GDP per worker. But table 3 also shows that the obsolescence rate 
is crucial to determine growth rate of ideas. Without new investigations about the pace 
with which new ideas substitute old ones, it is very difficult to present more accurate 
estimates of the growth rate of ideas, and consequently, a more truthful assessment of 
the precise figures of l  and f . 
                                                            
18 Czech Republic and Slovakia are excluded due to the paucity of data.  
19 The use of averaged count of patents is owed to the need of taking to account the bureaucratic cycles 
in the grant of patents. However, the consideration in the numerator of utility patents of 1998 alone, 
makes  the  growth  rate  of  ideas  higher,  but  it  doesn’t  modify  the  conclusions  obtained  fort  the 
relationship between per capita output growth and the growth of ideas.    17 
Table 3 
Ideas growth and growth trend of real GDP 
Ideas growth trend, 
1964-2002 
Ideas growth rate, 
1998  Growth trend of: 
 
(d=0%)  (d=5%)  (d=0)  (d=5%) 
Real  GDP 
per  worker, 
1962-2000 
Real  GDP 
per  capita, 
1950-2000 
Germany  4.26  3.94  2.97  6.80  1.34***  2.06* 
Australia  6.58  6.24  4.97  9.51  1.36  2.10 
Austria  5.2  4.78  3.35  7.25  2.55  3.37 
Belgium  5.25  4.58  4.90  10.28  2.10  2.82 
Canada  4.23  3.86  4.20  9.10  1.23  2.21 
Korea  23.54  23.50  24.28  29.31  5.68  5.73 
Denmark  4.47  4.00  4.36  9.57  1.34  2.33 
Spain  5.81  5.42  5.32  10.36  2.20  3.41 
USA  1.85  1.25  2.20  6.64  1.62  2.27 
Finland  9.94  9.79  7.88  12.83  2.38  2.99 
France  4.29  3.95  3.28  7.34  2.11  2.84 
Greece  2.62  2.03  2.45  7.02  2.15  3.28 
Netherlands  3.66  3.36  2.94  6.94  1.30  2.43 
Hungary  6.20  6.16  1.64  3.53  2.45*  1.55* 
Ireland  10.41  9.78  6.70  11.21  3.54  3.29 
Iceland  8.23  6.52  4.59  9.46  1.65  2.92 
Italy  4.33  4.21  3.61  7.77  2.62  3.33 
Japan  12.52  12.02  6.83  11.01  3.56  4.79 
Luxembourg  5.98  6.21  2.99  6.09  2.94  2.87 
Mexico  5.48  -1.81  0.00  6.65  -0.76  2.07 
Norway  5.03  4.52  4.49  8.91  2.26  2.98 
New Zealand  5.87  5.73  5.34  10.58  0.21  1.34 
Poland  6.01  4.72  1.75  4.53  2.28**  1.23* 
Portugal  2.87  2.27  2.97  7.70  2.89  3.89 
United Kingdom  1.95  1.45  1.77  5.18  1.76  2.08 
Sweden  3.58  3.00  2.71  6.94  1.23  2.16 
Switzerland  2.26  2.16  1.65  4.82  0.56  1.68 
Turkey  8.14  6.50  2.74  5.48  2.50  2.35 
Source of calculations: PWT 6.1 (GDP per capita) and USPTO (patents). Notes: *Calculated only 
after 1970; ** Calculated only after 1979; *** Calculated only after 1990.   18 
But, in terms of large trends, obsolescence rate seems to have a minor effect on the 
measured growth rate of ideas. The behaviour of the long-term growth trend of ideas 
allows us to make some comments about the equivalence between  A A ￿  and  y y ￿ . First, 
the figures showed allow us to detect an association connecting the growth of ideas 
and economic growth, being the latter measured by real GDP per capita or real GDP 
per worker 
Source: the same as table 3. 
Figure 2, shows the association linking the growth of ideas and the growth of GDP per 
worker,  in  22  OECD  countries  (the  same  countries  of  reduced  sample,  plus 
Luxembourg). Both variable figures are calculated following the table 3 methodology 
and assuming a 5% obsolescence rate. As it is apparent from the graph, a large part of 
the association between the growth of ideas and economic growth depends on the 
South Korea figures. But if we exclude this country of the sample, the association 
keeps statistically significant: the correlation between  y y ￿  and  A A ￿ , is lower than 
previously, but t statistic referent to the regression of  A A ￿  on  y y ￿  keeps maintaining 
the coefficient of the growth of ideas statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Secondly, a possible explanation for dissimilarity between the growth rate of GDP per 
worker and the growth rate of ideas, besides problems associated to errors of variable 
measurement,  should  be  the  fact  that  the  share  of  labour  employed  in  the  ideas 
production have increased over time. As in the long run the share of researchers in 
Figure 2. Association between growth of  GDP per worker and growth of ideas 
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Aus  19 
total population can’t increase without limit, it is likely that the growth rate of ideas 
will approach the growth rate of GDP per capita.  
Our results in testing the ideas production function allow us to emphasise two main 
findings: on the one hand, the model has more explicative power to the growth of 
reduced sample than to the sample-basis indicating that, in the excluded countries, the 
growth process should rest on a different mechanism. On the other hand, we conclude 
that  some  assumptions,  where  ideas  driven  models  are  usually  grounded,  as  with 
1 = f , have low likelihood. 
To illustrate the first finding, let’s confront Portugal with the United States and the 
reduced sample of OECD. In figures 3, 4, and 5 the evolution of the stock of ideas 
index and the real per worker GDP index, from 1963 to 2000 (base year 1963), are 
represented
20. 
Source: Real per worker GDP — PWT 6.1; patent counts — USPTO. 
Figure 3 shows that in the United States, the evolution of the stock of ideas is similar 
to the evolution of the real GDP per worker. Nevertheless, the growth rate of stock of 
ideas, averaged yearly with a 5% obsolescence rate (1,25%), was slightly inferior to 
the growth rate of GDP per worker (1,62%). However, the latter figure is lower than 
the  ideas  trend,  where  we  consider  0%  as  obsolescence  rate,  indicating  that  the 
equality is possible if the obsolescence rate lies somewhere between 0% and 5%. But, 
more importantly, the mere observation of figure 3 shows that the equality between 
y y ￿  and  A A ￿  is not unreliable in the long run, as the model tested predicts.  
                                                            
20 The stock of ideas was calculated with a 5% obsolescence rate. 




















































































Y/L  20 
Furthermore,  at  the level  of  the  group of countries, which  compound  the  reduced 
sample, we present a dynamic behaviour of productivity and ideas, which the model 
predicts. To construct figure 4, we have calculated the average output per worker for a 
group of 21 OECD countries and the average stock of ideas for the same countries for 
every year from 1963 to 2000. So, figure 4 shows that the evolution of ideas was very 
similar to the evolution of real output per worker
21. 
Source: Real per worker GDP — PWT 6.1; patent counts — USPTO. 
But, besides similar evolution, our data show the equality of the averaged growth 
rates. For the whole group of countries, from 1963 to 2000, the growth trend of the 
stock  of  ideas  (2,14%)  was  evenly equal to the  growth trend of GDP  per worker 
(2,10%)
22.  On  the  contrary,  in  Portugal,  equality  between  y y ￿   and  A A ￿   is out of 
question, as it is apparent by the observation of figure 5.  
In the Portuguese economy, with the exception of the 1974-85 period, marked by 
instability, the increase  in the output per  worker seems always to anticipate ideas 
growth, not allowing us to think that, also in this way, the domestic creation of new 
ideas shall be the Portuguese engine of growth. As we have showed in other work the 
cause of Portuguese economic growth in the second half of the twenty century was the 
international technology diffusion
23. 
                                                            
21 Countries included are the same of the reduced sample except Germany, and plus Luxembourg. The 
exclusion of Germany is owing to paucity of data in PWT 6.1, referring to real GDP per worker. 
22 Both rates are instantaneous and calculated trough the adjustment of an exponential trend line.  
23 See Pessoa 2003, chapters IV and V. 





















































































Y/L  21 
Source: Real per worker GDP — PWT 6.1; patent counts — USPTO. 
With respect to the second main finding, our results contribute to more solid critiques 
to  the  ideas  driven  model.  In  effect,  in  the  ideas  driven  model  (Romer,  1990; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991; and Aghion and Howitt, 1992) it is usually assumed 
that  1 = f . In other words, new ideas are produced proportionally to the existing stock 
of ideas. Consequently, economic growth rate is proportional to the research carried 
out. However, if we admit such an assumption, population growth leads to per capita 
income  acceleration.  For,  everything  else  constant,  an  increase  in  the  population 
dimension increases the number of researchers and leads to an increase in the per 
capita growth rate. Several authors have criticised the model, because there was no 
evidence  of  any  relationship  between  population  size  and  growth  rates,  in  cross-
country data.  
However, it’s important to note that the ideas-driven model is meant to describe the 
advanced countries of the world, taken as a whole, as figure 4 shows. Being so, one 
can’t take evidence on population growth across countries to test de model. Since there 
is trade between economies, the population growth rate relevant to the ideas growth 
model is not the resident in the country but all the people that is related to the ideas 
growth. In other words, there may exist international spillovers that are not translated 
in the estimates
24. 
                                                            
24 For instance, the U. S. economy doesn’t benefit only of either the ideas created in United States or of 
the scale of production of its internal market.  
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6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The existence of marginal decreasing returns in each one of the factors of the ideas 
production function, has as main consequence that a constant growth rate of ideas 
depends on the constant growth of resources affected to the production of ideas, in a 
way that policies inducing growth of ideas production should increase the productivity 
level, but have no impact on the long run growth rate
25. On the contrary, if we admit 
1 = = l f   restrictions,  the  growth  rate  of  ideas  is  a  function  of  the  level  of  effort 
dedicated to the production of ideas —  A L A A p = ￿ . Being so, policies that permanently 
affect the level of LA, have permanent effects on ideas growth rate and, consequently, 
on the economic growth rate. 
However, in medium term, the model can have a similar behaviour with f =1 and with 
f <1, if in this case the f  estimate lay near 1. Assuming a change, even small, in the 
number of researchers, for  f  figures near of 1, a significant increase in the level of 
ideas productivity might result, according to  ( ) f l - 1 , when a large transition period 
comes to the end. This upsurge would put the level of ideas on a figure nearer to that 
resulting of  l  e  f  both equal to 1. That is, no matter how the model steady-state 
predictions may be different, the model behaves similarly when f  moves toward 1.  
But, if the differences are not apparent in the medium term, the actual value of f  has 
an important impact in terms of policy implications, because the ideas-driven growth 
depends on maintaining innovation incentives. Incentives preservation command that 
marginal  productivity  of  ideas  sector  increases  proportionally to TFP and  that  the 
producers are able of appropriate on the marginal product of their own ideas. If  1 < f , 
the marginal productivity of ideas sector decreases over time. When this happens, the 
viability of the ideas sector depends on the public incentives to the production of 
knowledge, being in this way public intervention justified in order to induce growth 
positively. 
                                                            
25 Constant growth rate of ideas, in the long run, depends on the growth rate of the effort dedicated to 
ideas production ( ) A A L L ￿ , as is the logic of equation 11.    23 
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